A growing literature examines the ways community characteristics affect local environmental outcomes. Recent studies have shown the importance of various economic and political factors in explaining the level of toxic releases or local ambient pollution (e.g., Kriesel et al. 1996; Arora and Cason 1999) , the siting of polluting facilities (e.g., Hamilton 1993 Hamilton , 1995 Wolverton 2002) , local regulatory enforcement (e.g., Gray and Deily 1996; Helland 1998a Helland , 1998b , voting patterns on environmentrelated ballot initiatives (Kahn and Matsusaka 1997) , and general attitudes towards the environment (e.g., Elliott et al. 1997) . Explanatory variables common to many of these studies include household incomes, house values, population density, educational attainment, poverty rate, racial composition, voting behavior, and other measures of local demographics, economic conditions, and political opposition.
In this paper, I examine whether local factors help explain the level of pollution abatement expenditures by manufacturing plants. If certain populations are indeed exposed to lower levels of pollution, as previous studies have suggested, it may be that (a) a smaller number of polluting facilities are located in those communities and/or (b) facilities in those areas invest much more in abatement than they would have otherwise. The latter is the subject of this study.
Here, plant-level air pollution abatement (henceforth, "APA") expenditure per dollar of output is modeled as a function of formal air quality regulation at the federal, state, and county levels, as well as county characteristics potentially affecting such expenditures, either because facilities behave differently in such areas and/or local regulators regulate more (or less) stringently in such areas. In certain contexts, this might be called "informal regulation" (see Pargal and Wheeler 1996) ; in the United States, however, community influence may still be transmitted through established regulatory channels. "Less formal" regulation, therefore, may be a better description of the focus of this paper.
The principle motivation here is to provide additional evidence on which community characteristics impact local environmental outcomes. The literature to date simply has not reached any consensus on this front.
1 This paper's chief innovation in this realm is that it is the first to look at the effects on the environmental expenditures of firms. In principle, this should yield the same expected results as studies based on other outcomes since they are all obviously interrelated: community preferences manifest themselves in voting and lobbying, which in turn may affect local regulatory enforcement, which in turn affects abatement expenditures, which in turn affect facility emissions and/or plant location, which in turn affect local ambient pollution. However, given potentially serious concerns with the measurement of some of these environmental outcomes, the examination of several different ones-including my focus on pollution abatement expenditure-is certainly a worthwhile endeavor, in order to gauge 1 Part of the issue may certainly be that these studies have chosen to examine-not simply different outcomes, but perhaps more importantly-different pollutants, industries, geographies, and/or time periods.
the robustness of previous and future findings in this area. 2 Another desirable feature of this paper's approach over several others' is that it peers deeper inside the "black box". Besides the effect of community characteristics, firms' decisions regarding pollution abatement expenditure may obviously also depend on the industry a plant is in, the formal regulation it faces, and its age, size, corporate ownership, productivity, profitability, and so forth-factors that cannot be adequately explored (or controlled for) using anything but establishment-level data. Here, I use establishment-level data on APA expenditures from the Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey, with additional establishment-level controls coming from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM).
Results show that, after controlling for establishment characteristics and various forms of formal regulation, some community characteristics have an additional effect on APA expenditures, others do not. Some of the most noteworthy results are for a subsample of establishments that are particularly high air polluters. In this group, some of the political/self-interest factors are found to be statistically significant determinants of APA activity. As in some other studies, the percent of homes in an area that are owneroccupied is found to improve local environmental outcomes-in this case, APA investment. Homeowners care about maintaining their properties' value and may lobby for more stringent regulation than normally required by their state or federal government. Others have argued that a higher proportion of renters implies lower sunk costs and higher mobility by local residents-and therefore less compensation is required in the event of damages.
The proportion of the local population that is engaged in manufacturing or is unemployed has the opposite effect, at least among the most polluting industries. This is also consistent with some previous findings and suggests that those that feel their livelihoods threatened by increased regulation will oppose it. Political ideology-as measured by the percent who vote Democrat-also appears to have an impact on the local environment, as in the work of Kahn, but voter turnout-a measure of a populace's potential for political action, introduced into this literature by Hamilton (1993)-generally does not exhibit the hypothesized effect.
Larger per capita income is also found to have a positive effect on the APA expenditure of plants, consistent with the notion that the environment is a normal good and/or that plants abate more in areas where potential economic damages are higher. Few of the other variables related to would-be compensation, however, such as population density, education, and home value, are found to have the expected effects.
2 Take, for instance, pollution-based measures. At the plant-level, "emissions" are very often just engineering estimates based on input usage, emissions factors, and various other assumptions, rather than actual readings from monitoring devices. Meanwhile, data on ambient air pollution levels are also quite problematic. Monitor placement is almost certainly endogenous; that is, monitors are placed in areas that are suspected to have high pollution concentrations and/or their placement may be determined community characteristics. Furthermore, most areas simply have no pollution monitors at all, which obviously limits analyses-e.g., by eliminating important control groups. Another obvious question is which pollution statistics are most relevant-e.g., peak readings or averages-and how one aggregates the readings from several nearby monitors.
And in terms of "environmental injustice," I find, at best, mixed evidence that plants in areas with large nonwhite and/or foreign-born populations have significantly different APA expenditures.
Overall, these results suggest that some communities can and do adopt stricter environmental standards, over and above any formal regulatory requirements. This can lead to a shift in the relative spatial distribution of pollution, resulting in pollution haven effects. Furthermore, if local populations can indeed affect the expenditures of polluting facilities, they can (at the margin) potentially impact the location of such facilities, further reinforcing pollution haven effects. Previous research has already shown that formal air quality regulation-particularly the Clean Air Act and its amendments-has led to (perhaps unintended) shifts in the location of air polluting activity (e.g., Henderson 1996; Kahn 1997a; Becker and Henderson 2000; Greenstone 2002) , presumably due to the spatial variation inherent in these regulatory costs (Becker and Henderson 2001; Becker 2005) . This current study is the first to directly examine the effects of "less formal" regulation on the costs of air polluters, using the establishmentlevel data developed by Becker (2005) to study the impact of formal air quality regulation.
In the next section, I review some of the previous literature in this area. This is followed by Section 2, which discusses the community characteristics under study here, as well as the data and methodology that are used. Empirical results are presented in Section 3, followed by a section of concluding remarks.
Previous Literature
Much of the previous literature in this area has explored the apparent correlation between minority populations and local pollution levels and the siting of polluting facilities. Several recent studies have begun debunking the notion of "environmental racism," finding that other factors-some correlated with race-may play a more dominant role. Hamilton (1993) , for example, examines the expansion plans of hazardous waste processing facilities and finds that a county's potential for collective action-as measured by voter turnout-is the most influential community characteristic in determining where noxious activities were (and were not) sited-demand, supply, and factor costs being equal. "Coasian" variables related to the would-be compensation from environmental damages-for example, median household income, house value, college education, population density, and urban population-are generally found not to have an effect, with the exception perhaps on sitings prior to the mid-1980s. A county's racial (nonwhite) composition does not matter in the principle specifications, but may have played a role with respect to which sites had planned contractions.
In Hamilton (1995) , he performs similar analyses at the zip code level and expands the set of community characteristics examined. Again, the primary explanation is the threat of collective action-i.e., political opposition. The only economic characteristics that ever matter are total population-i.e., the number of potential "victims"-and the percent of the population that rents-i.e., a proxy for attachment to a locale and sunk costs. As before, race is not a statistically significant factor in the regression analyses even though nonwhite population and hazardous waste capacity expansion are positively correlated.
3 "Pure discrimination" therefore is not a likely explanation. Kriesel et al. (1996) continue this line of investigation by exploring toxic emissions inside Census block groups in Georgia and Ohio. The authors show that statistical evidence of environmental racism disappears as explanatory variables are added to the analysis. In the end, only poverty rate, educational attainment, and the presence of an interstate highway-an industrial location factor-helped explain local exposure to toxic pollutants. Voter turnout had an effect that was opposite of what Hamilton found, and house value, population density, and manufacturing employment had no statistically significant effect. The authors also explore the toxic releases of new hazardous waste facilities and find that race and income do not matter, while voter turnout continues to have a positive effect, as does interstate highways. Population density has a negative effect on toxic emissions, and some evidence is found that average house value also has a negative effect.
More recently, Arora and Cason (1999) examined toxic emissions at the zip code level, employing a sample selection model and a long list of local economic, demographic, and political characteristics. No strong, consistent results emerge across areas of the country. Race matters, but only under very specific conditions: "non-urban" areas of the South. A number of economic and "political" variables also matter in the South, such as household income, housing vacancy, unemployment, and the percent who rent homes. Many fewer factors are significant outside the South, limited at times to percent foreign-born, educational attainment, and total population. The political/ collective action variables are generally either statistically insignificant or wrongsigned.
Like the previous two papers, Kahn (1997b) also looks at toxic emissions using data from EPA's Toxics Release Inventory. He also examines county-level ambient air quality with respect to two pollutants: particulates and sulfur dioxide. In this study, the effects of local economic and political characteristics-in particular, per capita income, manufacturing's share of local employment, percent who voted Democrat, college graduates, and population density-are only of secondary interest, meant to control for differential regulatory enforcement across counties as well as notions of Coasian compensation (see Hamilton 1993) . Nonetheless, some evidence is found that all these factors matter, in the expected ways.
Other strands of literature have focused on quite different environmental outcomes. Gray and Deily (1996) , for example, look at air pollution inspections and enforcement actions taken against U.S. steel mills. They hypothesize that regulators may be more reluctant to act against plants when the political costs are high-for example, when the firm accounts for a large share of the locale's total employment and/or unemployment is high in the county. They find strong evidence that at least the former is true. Eric Helland, in a series of papers, also explores the determinants of environmental inspections and discovers that local characteristics often play a role. In Helland (1998a) , for example, he finds that pulp and paper mills experience more inspections in counties with higher per capita income and fewer inspections in states with larger numbers of manufacturing facilities. The latter is thought to measure the caseload burden faced by regulators.
Meanwhile, Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) examine cross-county voting outcomes in the State of California with respect to 16 environment-related ballot initiatives, including ones on toxic disclosure, environmental protection & conservation, expanding parklands, pesticide bans, etc. Here, the environment is treated as-and found to behave much like-any other good: its demand is driven by both income and "prices". In particular, the authors find that many of these "goods" are normal at mean income levels and inferior (perhaps) at higher incomes. Prices are proxied by measures of "selfinterest"-namely, the share of local employment and income derived from affected sectors (e.g., manufacturing, construction, farming, and/or forestry) as well as the educational attainment of the populace (i.e., a measure of potential worker displacement). These price variables had their expected effect in the majority of cases. They also find an added effect from political ideology-or "preferences"-as measured by the percent who register or vote Democrat. Elliott et al. (1997) , in their examination of survey data on public attitudes toward environmental spending, also find that (self-identified) Democrats and liberals are more likely to support environmental causes. In addition, they find that environmentalism is higher among women, those with some college education, wealthier households, nonwhite populations, and residents of major metropolitan areas. They hypothesize that the views of the latter two groups are perhaps influenced by their exposure to pollution and other environmental hazards. Meanwhile, full-time workers are less likely to support additional environmental spending, as are older individuals. The authors hypothesize that the former may reflect less leisure time to enjoy the environment, and the latter may suggest cohort effects and/or the smaller present value of a cleaner environment for older people.
Data and Methodology

Community Characteristics
In this study, I examine expenditures on air pollution abatement by manufacturing establishments and the effect community characteristics have on the decisions of these plants and/or the regulators who regulate them. I draw upon the previous literature for local factors that may influence this outcome as well as contribute a few new variables to the usual mix. They can be broadly-and somewhat arbitrarily-classified as belonging to one of four groups: (1) political/self-interest variables, (2) income and preferences, (3) Coasian compensation variables, and (4) other factors driving regulators and/or facilities. These variables are described briefly in Table 1 and highlighted and further discussed below. As in Hamilton (1993) , Gray and Deily (1996) , Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) , Kahn (1997b ), and Helland (1998a , 1998b , my geographic unit of analysis is the county.
First, in terms of political/self-interest variables, some local constituencies may demand that their regulators adopt policies more stringent than required by their state or federal government-e.g., under the Clean Air Act. A higher density of population surrounding a plant, for example, may increase the pressure placed on it since its emissions (left unabated) adversely affect that many more people. And homeowners in particular may demand greater pollution abatement efforts from their nearby plants; numerous studies have demonstrated a relationship between ambient air quality and property values (e.g., Chay and Greenstone 2004) . Other groups, however, may be more hostile to additional environmental protection. The unemployed and those engaged in manufacturing, in particular, may feel their very livelihoods threatened by increased regulation. And, as in several of the cited studies, I also include voter turnout as a measure of a populace's ability to take collective action.
Second, apart from these potential political factors, the demand for environmental quality, like that for any other good, may simply derive from income and preferences. If environmental protection is indeed a normal good, wealthier counties-as measured by per capita income-might be expected to press for stricter requirements on their polluting plants. Demand might also be expected to depend on one's vulnerability to air pollution, and the EPA has identified children and the elderly among those particularly at risk (sensitive population).
4 I further proxy for a county's "taste for health" by observing the number of active doctors per capita. Finally, I also allow political ideology to shape a county's preference for environmental protection. Here, as in Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) , this is measured by the percent of (major party) votes cast for the Democratic presidential candidate.
Third, an establishment may consider would-be compensation for environmental damages posed by its operation in deciding where to locate and how much to invest in pollution abatement. Areas with high rates of poverty and/or low levels of educational attainment may result in lower damages being awarded in the event of injuries and/or deaths from accidental exposure. Similarly, litigation may result in compensation for reduced property values. Here, I include the median value of houses in the county. Population density and per capita income-mentioned previously-are also likely to be considered Coasian-type variables.
Finally, other local characteristics may also explain the "supply" of environmental protection. As noted, much has been written on the issue of environmental injustice (or environmental inequity, racism, discrimination, etc.)-the notion that polluting facilities are more likely to be situated near minority communities and/or toxic emissions are higher in such areas. Here, I allow for the possibility of such discrimination on the part 
The Establishment-level Data
The establishment-level data for this study come from the Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) surveys of 1979-1982, 1984-1986, and 1988 . My particular variable of interest is air pollution abatement operating costs, which includes salaries & wages, parts & materials, fuel & electricity, capital depreciation, contract work, equipment leasing, and other operating costs associated with a plant's abatement of air pollution in that calendar year. 6, 7 To this I merge data that these plants may have reported in the contemporaneous Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). The ASM data provide me with some important, basic information on these plants, including establishment employment, value of output, total 5 The local characteristics these various variables attempt to capture are, for the most part, ones that are unlikely to have changed very much, or in important ways, during the time period under study here. They are therefore treated as time-invariant in the specification below. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, the explanatory variables generally predate the expenditure being analyzed. The fact that APA expenditures, as collected by the PACE survey, is not observable to the public by locality further weakens potential endogeneity. 6 See U.S. Bureau of the Census (various years) for additional details. 7 It has been suggested that a focus on only air pollution abatement may yield misleading conclusions if establishments merely substitute away from other types of environmental expenditure-e.g., water pollution abatement-to address a concern that is perhaps more noticeable to the general public. Greenstone (2003) , however, finds that reductions in facilities' air pollution emissions, in response to air quality regulation, did not result in increased releases into other media, namely water and ground. Concerns about cross-media substitution, therefore, appear unfounded. operating costs, location, industry, age, and ownership.
8 After restricting my attention to cases that were in both the PACE and ASM samples in a given year, and after eliminating survey non-respondents, certain item non-respondents, non-manufacturing establishments, and inactive and otherwise out-of-scope plants, I am left with 89,889 plant-years of observations for my empirical analyses. Additional detail regarding data sources, variable construction, and the research sample can be found in Becker (2005) and in a separate working paper available from the author.
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Besides community characteristics, establishments' air pollution abatement (APA) expenditures may be driven by a host of other factors. Outlays, for example, will obviously depend on the size of the establishment. I therefore define my dependent variable as:
where i indexes an establishment; APA is dollars of air pollution abatement operating costs; and Q is dollars of output. 10, 11 This too may vary by the size of the plant however, if returns to scale in pollution abatement are present, for example. Establishment employment and employment squared, therefore, will be used as control variables in the empirical analyses. Other establishment characteristics possibly affecting the intensity of APA activity are the age of the plant and whether or not it belongs to a multi-plant firm. The former will be represented by a series of dummy variables indicating the time elapsed since the establishment's first appearance in the Census of Manufactures (conducted every five years); the latter is captured by a simple dummy variable. I also control for plant productivity, as measured by real value added per worker, using data from the ASM.
Measures of Formal Air Quality Regulation
Formal regulation obviously also plays a role in determining how much APA is done by plants. At the national level, certain industries are inherently more polluting and are therefore regulated more intensely. Here, I control for the stringency of this regulation with an industry-level air pollution intensity index constructed using the IPPS air emissions coefficients described by Hettige et al. (1994) . In particular, for each 4-digit SIC industry, I sum the estimates of pounds of emissions per dollar of output for sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ), nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ), carbon monoxide (CO), total suspended 8 The establishment-level survey data in both the PACE and ASM are confidential, collected and protected under Title 13 of the U.S. Code. Restricted access to these data can be arranged through the Census Bureau's Center for Economic Studies. See http://www.ces.census.gov/ for details. 9 Becker (2005) also addresses the quality of the PACE data-a concern that has been raised by a number of observers. 10 Output in the ASM is measured by total value of shipments adjusted for net changes to inventory and the value of products resold as originally purchased. 11 The mean APA intensity in this sample is 0.00242 (i.e., APA operating costs are 0.242% of total output) with a standard deviation of 0.06356. In all, the plants in this sample incurred about $28.5 billion worth of APA operating costs (in 1988 dollars).
particulates (TSP), and volatile organic compounds (VOC)-all pollutants covered under the Clean Air Act. 12 Beyond this "federal" regulation, state-level variation in environmental regulations also exists, and a number of indexes measuring the relative stringency of such regulation have been developed, some of which even employ data from the PACE survey (see Levinson 2001 for a review). Here, however, I will simply use state dummy variables to control for interstate differences in regulation and APA costs.
Below the state level, the Clean Air Act requires that all locales achieve the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) set for the six "criteria" air pollutants. A growing literature is finding that county-level non-attainment of these NAAQS significantly impacts heavy air polluters, presumably through more stringent regulation (e.g., Henderson 1996; Kahn 1997a; Becker and Henderson 2000, 2001; List and McHone 2000; Greenstone 2002; Becker 2005) . Here, as in Becker (2005), I capture this regulation through a series of indicator variables, indicating whether the establishment is a "high emitter" of any of the criteria air pollutants in a county that is non-attainment of the NAAQS for the respective pollutant(s). 13 It is important to note that this county-level NAAQS-related regulation is not determined by the community characteristics under study here. Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between plant-level air pollution abatement activity and the community characteristics. Seven of the sixteen correlations are statistically significant, with homeownership and unemployment positively related to air pollution abatement expenditure, and income, doctors, education, home value, and metropolitan area status negatively correlated. With the exception of homeownership, the direction of these statistically significant correlations are the opposite of what might be hypothesized; however, multiple regression analysis is obviously the much more 12 Note that equal weight is given to each of these pollutants though their actual toxicities may differ. Also, the IPPS data come on the 1987 SIC basis while the establishments in my sample are classified according to 1972 SIC definitions. The IPPS data are converted to the 1972 SIC basis using a 1987-1972 SIC concordance table with shipment weights. Data are missing for about a dozen of the 450 or so industries. These industries are treated with dummy variables instead. The empirical results that follow validate this measure of national regulation, with strong positive coefficients in all specifications, suggesting that the most air pollution intensive industries face the most regulation and, hence, spend the most on APA. 13 I classify establishments as (potential) heavy emitters of the criteria air pollutants according to their 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. In turn, I categorize industries as high emitters based on data in the EPA's Aerometric Information Retrieval System (AIRS). Among other things, the AIRS database maintains an inventory of facilities in the United States (classified by industry) that emit a threshold amount of any of the six criteria pollutants. I label an industry-and all its plants-a "high emitter" of a particular air pollutant if it had a minimum number of establishments emitting above that threshold. See Becker (2005) for additional details, including the list of industries defined as high air pollution emitters. appropriate way to explore these various relationships.
Empirical Approach
14 To summarize my empirical approach, plant-level air pollution abatement operating costs, as specified in equation (1), are modeled as a function of the community characteristics that are of interest in this study (i.e., "less formal" regulation), establishment characteristics, and formal regulation from various sources. 15 Year effects are also incorporated. A double log functional form is assumed here because it is found to fit the data much better than alternative forms (e.g., linear, semi-log). Since the value of the dependent variable is bounded from below, Tobit specifications are employed.
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The next section will present results, first using only community characteristics as explanatory variables, then adding plant characteristics, and then state and NAAQSrelated regulation. Results are presented for both the full sample as well as for a 14 It should be noted that-while some of these community characteristics may be well correlated with each other (never more than =0.8 however)-multicollinearity is not found to be an issue in the analyses and results that follow. 15 While this study attempts to control for all the relevant determinants of APA, we cannot rule out the possibility of some remaining omitted variable bias. 16 In particular, establishments are asked to report their APA expenditures in thousands of dollars. Therefore, with rounding, an entry of zero reflects expenditures of less than $500. The cnreg (censored normal regression) command in Stata is a generalization of the standard Tobit procedure that allows the censoring point to vary by observation. In this case, left-censoring occurs at ln(0.5/Q i ) for about 53.5% of the plants in this sample. subsample of establishments that are particularly heavy air polluters. In particular, (approximately) the top quartile of plants-in terms of their air pollution intensity index-are analyzed separately. These plants should be the most sensitive to the factors under examination here. Some 100 unique 4-digit SIC industries are represented in this subsample, compared to 435 in the full sample. Table 3 contains results for the full sample of establishments; Table 4 contains results for the subsample of high air polluters. In each table, the first column presents model coefficients controlling only for industry effects-via the air pollution intensity index described above-and year effects. The model in the second column adds establishment-level controls: employment and employment squared, age variables, productivity, and a dummy variable indicating "multi-unit" plants. The model in the third column additionally controls for state-level effects-including differences in air quality regulation between states-via state dummy variables, as well as county-level regulation resulting from the Clean Air Act-i.e., indicators of county NAAQS nonattainment of the respective criteria air pollutants and interactions between county nonattainment statuses and indicators of whether the establishment is a high emitter of the respective air pollutants. Given the double log functional form, reported coefficients are elasticities. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level-using robust Huber-White standard errors-is indicated by single and double asterisks, respectively.
Results
In Table 3 , most of the coefficients on the community characteristics are statistically significant. Most of these effects, however, are opposite of what might be expected. Among the expected effects, higher rates of homeownership are found to increase APA expenditure, as are higher incomes, higher propensities to vote Democrat, and being in a metropolitan statistical area. And once the fuller set of controls is in place, in column 3, APA activity is also found to be lower in counties with larger nonwhite populations, suggesting environmental injustice. The percent of the population that is foreign-born, however, is found to have the opposite effect on environmental expenditures. Also having effects opposite of what is expected are population density, unemployment, manufacturing, sensitive populations, poverty, and educational attainment. 18 The coefficient on voter turnout, meanwhile, has the expected sign-only after state and NAAQS-related regulation are controlled for-but does not quite attain statistical significance. And the number of other local air polluters per capita has the right sign and is statistically significant until those final controls are put in place.
This mix of expected and unexpected results using the full sample can be somewhat puzzling. It is important to note, however, that most of the plants in this sample are not large air polluters. In fact, I estimate that the median plant in this sample had about 22 17 The list of 100 industries is available from the author upon request. 18 The result on manufacturing would suggest that affected employees actually lobby for additional APA, perhaps in lieu of possible plant downsizing or closure. However, the inclusion of a plant-specific measure of employment expansion/contraction in these regressions does not alter this result. tons of annual emissions of all criteria air pollutants.
19 As a point of reference, this is far from being a facility that the EPA would list as a "major" source, which generally requires at least 100 tons of emissions of one of these air pollutants. Many of these plants are likely to be exempt from most (if not all) forms of formal air quality regulation. And indeed, nearly two-thirds of the establishments that are minimal air polluters-i.e., they are not in my subsample of high emitters-have no APA operating costs at all.
Why do the rest of these minimal polluters have non-zero APA expenditures, and why should they be related to community characteristics? It is not absolutely clear. It may suggest some form of reporting error. In particular, if one believes that these plants should have little or no APA expenditure, the results here would suggest potential overreporting of expenditure in areas that are less densely settled, have higher unemployment, have more manufacturing, are less college educated, etc. Perhaps an unmeasured sentiment exists in such areas regarding government regulation (and/or government surveys) that lead respondents to intentionally misstate their costs. 20 This issue is certainly worth further study-especially if reporting error is suggested-but is well beyond the scope of this current study. The remainder of the paper will focus on just the highest emitting industries, as is typical in the environmental literature.
21 Table 4 contains the results for this subsample of high air polluters. 22 We see in column 1 that most of these sixteen community characteristics have a statistically significant effect on plant-level APA operating costs, including eight that have their hypothesized effect. Of those that don't have their expected effect: Increased voter turnout is found to decrease APA expenditure. Its statistical significance diminishes however once plant characteristics and state and NAAQS-related regulation are controlled for (column 3) though it still has a t-statistic of 1.44. Only Hamilton (1993 Hamilton ( , 1995 has really ever found this factor to have a positive effect on the local environment. Educational attainment is also found to have a statistically significant negative effect on APA activity in a community, but this too becomes statistically zero once state dummies and NAAQS-related regulation are added to the specification. Meanwhile, higher nonwhite populations are found to increase local APA expenditure, 19 Plant-level emissions of the five criteria air pollutants (SO 2 , NO 2 , CO, TSP, and VOC) are estimated by multiplying the industry-level IPPS emission factors for each pollutant (for employment) by total establishment employment. As explained in Hettige et al. (1994) , this will yield lower bound estimates of true emissions. 20 Having said that, regressions using just this sample of minimal polluters yield very low pseudo-R 2 statistics. Therefore, the model and the community characteristics are not explaining very much at all about the reported expenditures of these minimal air polluters. These regressions yield similar results to those reported in Table 3 , except that income, Democrats, and poverty become insignificant, and doctors and air polluters become statistically significant, with the expected signs. Most of the puzzles remain however. 21 For example, some of the studies cited in Section 1 focus on just one industry (e.g., hazardous waste processing, steel, pulp and paper). Furthermore, all studies based on TRI data inherently ignore the pollution releases of plants emitting below some threshold. 22 I estimate that the median plant in this group had over 700 tons of annual emissions of the criteria air pollutants. while the percent foreign-born is actually found to decrease such spending. Neither of these effects is statistically significant in the final specification however, suggesting little evidence of environmental discrimination among these highest polluters.
Population density is found to have a positive effect on APA activity, as might be expected. However, once state and NAAQS-related regulation are controlled for, this effect goes away. High density areas therefore enjoy additional abatement activity at their local plants, but only because they tend to be subject to greater formal regulation, not because these populaces can muster up more political opposition or because plants are insuring against greater potential damages. The number of other air polluters in the county-meant to capture the potential distraction of regulators-has a negative effect on APA expenditures, but not after one controls for plant-specific characteristics. The implication is that establishments in areas with many other polluting plants per capita, as it turns out, tend to be smaller, younger, less productive, and/or more likely to be "single unit" establishments. Sensitive populations (the young and elderly), the number of doctors, poverty rates, median home value, and unemployment have-for the most part-no effect in any of the regressions in Table 4 . The coefficient on unemployment, however, does have the correct (negative) sign and does attain statistical significance at around the 17% level.
Meanwhile, five of these community characteristics have strong, statistically significant effects, of the expected sign, through all three of the regressions in Table 4 . 23 Indeed, these five factors are the only ones that are significant in the final specification with full controls (column 3). These robust results include:
(1) Higher rates of homeownership are found to increase APA expenditure, consistent with the notion that constituencies will lobby to protect the value of their property. 24 Other studies have found similar effects. For example, Hamilton (1995) finds that zip codes with a higher percentage of renters are more likely to experience expansions in local hazardous waste facilities. Such residents, he argues, have less attachment to a particular area and therefore may place less value on maintaining its environment. Furthermore, they have fewer "sunk costs" in the area, which means firms may need to compensate them less in the event of damages. Similarly, Arora and Cason (1999) find that toxic emissions are higher in zip codes with higher concentration of renters, at least in the South.
(2) We also see that a heavy presence of manufacturing employment in a county reduces the amount of local APA expenditure, all else being equal. To use the language of Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) , the "price" of environmental protection is higher in such areas. Indeed, Gray and Deily (1996) find that steel mills that accounted for a greater proportion of the local labor force faced fewer regulatory actions and inspections. 25 Regulators, they argue, attempt to minimize the political costs of their actions, especially those that threaten the livelihoods of many employees and other local 23 Note that four of these five are also statistically significant and correctly-signed throughout Table 3 as well. 24 Interestingly, however, APA activity does not appear to be related to the value of homes. 25 Helland (1998b) finds similar results with pulp and paper mills. citizens. A similar effect-for similar reasons-is expected for areas with high local unemployment rates; however, the negative effect in column 3 of Table 4 does not quite attain statistical significance.
(3) Local income levels have a strong positive impact on the pollution abatement activity of these plants. Different and equally plausible interpretations are possible. Kriesel et al. (1996) -using poverty rates instead of income-find that toxic emissions are higher in more impoverished areas and characterize this as "discrimination against poor people." Hamilton (1993 Hamilton ( , 1995 and Arora and Cason (1999) -had they themselves found these effects-would have offered a Coasian explanation: polluters avoid polluting in areas where potential compensation for damages would be the highest. Meanwhile, Helland (1998a) , in his study of inspection targeting, and Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) , in their study of voting behavior, see the environment like any other normal good: demand increases with income. And indeed, household surveys show that wealthier individuals favor increased expenditure on the environment (Elliott et al. 1997) .
(4) Also in keeping with Kahn and Matsusaka, the political ideology of the populace is found to have an effect on environmental outcomes. In particular, the share of major party votes cast for the Democratic presidential candidate-which is meant to measure a locale's potential support for environmental causes, traditionally thought to be the Democrats' domain (see Elliott et al. 1997 )-appears to increase the APA expenditures of these polluting plants. Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) find that this variable explains at least some of the county-level variation in voting outcomes on environmental initiatives in California, and Kahn (1997b) shows that ambient TSP concentrations and TRI emissions are often lower in areas with concentrations of Democrats. Similarly, Earnhart (2004) finds that municipal wastewater treatment facilities in Kansas experience fewer environmental inspections and release more biological oxygen demand (BOD) in areas with higher percentages of Republican voters.
(5) Finally, being in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) increases APA outlays for these plants, all else being equal. Because I've controlled for many of the factors that are often correlated with cities-including population density, race, homeownership, income, and NAAQS non-attainment-one interpretation of this effect is that plants in these areas are scrutinized more intensely because regulators are more likely to be located nearby (relative to rural, non-metropolitan areas). Table 5 shows the impact on APA intensity of a one standard deviation increase in these variables from their respective means, holding all other variables constant, using the marginal effects from the regression in column 3 of Table 4 . Air pollution abatement is found to be most sensitive to changes in per capita income, with a standard deviation increase translating into a 13.5% increase in APA intensity. A standard deviation increase in votes for Democrats and homeownership rates implies an 11.6% and a 10.6% increase, respectively. Meanwhile, a standard deviation increase in a county's labor force engaged in manufacturing, from a mean of about 26.2%, would 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H o m e o w n e r s h i p +10.6% M a n u f a c t u r i n g -8.0% I n c o m e +13.5% D e m o c r a t s +11.6% M e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a +13.1% † Percentage change in APA intensity is computed for a one standard deviation change in the respective variable, from the means of the variables, holding all other covariates constant. The effect of metropolitan area is computed for the discrete change (from being outside to inside an MSA). The marginal effects are based on the regression in column 3 of Table 4. result in an 8.0% decrease in APA intensity. 26 A discrete change from being located in a county outside an MSA to being in an MSA implies a 13.1% increase in air pollution abatement operating costs, all else being equal.
Conclusions
The effect of community characteristics on local environmental outcomesparticularly toxic releases and pollution exposure-has received significant examination in recent years. If it is the case that certain populations face greater exposure to toxic and noxious air, this may be due to an extraordinary number of air polluters locating in such areas and/or facilities in those areas do not abate as much of their pollution. This paper focuses on the latter by examining whether spending by manufacturing plants on air pollution abatement-conditional on facility characteristics and various forms of formal regulation-depends in any way on the characteristics of the surrounding community, including socioeconomic composition, potential political opposition, economic conditions, and other possible factors.
For the most pollution-intensive industries, larger per capita income is found to increase plant-level APA activity, as is a higher degree of homeownership, a greater concentration of Democratic voters, and being located in an MSA. 27 Meanwhile, a greater presence of manufacturing employees is found to decrease the pollution abatement expenditure of these plants, suggesting a constituency that is more resistant to additional regulation. 28 Most of these results confirm precedents in the prior 26 An alternative to the double log functional form is a semi-log specification in which natural logarithms are taken of all variables except ones that are percentages (e.g., see Wolverton 2002) . In that case, the effect of these three percent-measured explanatory variables-i.e., Democrats, homeownership, and manufacturing-is 12.3%, 14.0%, and -19.2%, respectively. 27 These same effects are found with the full sample as well. 28 This paper does not attempt to explain whether regulators regulate more [less] stringently in areas with these characteristics or whether the plants themselves simply behave differently in such areas.
literature. If local populations can indeed affect pollution abatement activity, they can impact the spatial distribution of pollution, thereby creating pollution haven effects.
As interesting as what is found here, is what is not found. First, this paper uncovers no evidence that a populace's potential for collective action-as measured by voter turnout-raises the level of local air pollution abatement expenditure. Only Hamilton (1993 Hamilton ( , 1995 has ever really found this factor to have a positive effect on the local environment. Furthermore, none of the Coasian variables seem to have an effect on APA activity, with the exception of per capita income, which has alternative explanations. Finally, support for environmental injustice is, at best, mixed. Using the full sample, APA spending is indeed lower in areas with higher nonwhite populations, once the full set of control variables are in place. The percent of the population that is foreign-born, however, had the opposite effect. In terms of the highest air polluters, outlays are larger in nonwhite areas and smaller in counties with many foreign-bornsthat is until one controls for state and NAAQS-related regulation, which makes even these effects disappear. As this and other examples make clear, controlling for establishment characteristics and formal regulation is vitally important in a study such as this.
